Abstract. Agents derive benefit from communicating with each other. In order to communicate they need to have a language in common. Learning languages is costly. In this setting we discuss mechanisms that each satisfies three of the following requirements: Assignment Efficiency, StrategyProofness, Voluntary Participation and Feasibility.
Introduction
Individuals attach value to communication. This value may be inherent to communication per se, as human beings are "social animals". More importantly, however, the ability to communicate serves as a means for one's advancement professionally, socially and otherwise. This is as apparent today, as it has ever been. The benefits notwithstanding, communication does not come for free. The cost of communication proceeds from the presence of a multitude of different languages. There is hardly one individual that speaks all of the approximately 6000 languages that are spoken today, while there are plenty that speak exclusively one of them. The model we propose is the simplest one that adheres to these observations. The benefits of communication stem from the number of people one may communicate with, multiplied by a nonnegative real number that encompasses an individual's willingness to communicate (this is more or less the object for which Selten and Pool [10] coin the term 'communicative benefit'). The costs are determined by the language one speaks relative to the language one learns. Utility is separable in costs and benefits, and transferable. Figure 1 elaborates. Nodes denote individuals. The set of nodes is partitioned in three language groups, α, β, γ. Language α is native to individual i. An action will be depicted by an arrow stemming from a node and pointing to a set of nodes. Individual i learns languages β and γ. Individual i, therefore, speaks with four individuals, aside from those with whom he shared the same language in the first place. His benefit will be his personal willingness to communicate times four. Suppose c αβ , c αγ is the cost of learning β and γ respectively, if one speaks α natively. Individual i faces a cost equal to c αβ + c αγ .
The model depicted in Figure 1 will be the backdrop against which we will formulate our discussion. We will be interested in mechanisms. Roughly speaking, these objects associate a social outcome to the various values the primitives of the model may take. In particular, our main concern will be to examine the extent to which the following four properties can be attributed to such mechanisms:
(1) Assignment Efficiency : the sum of net benefits should be maximized.
(2) Strategy-Profness : all individuals, if asked, should have a dominant strategy to reveal their willingness to communicate truthfully. (3) Individual Rationality : no individual should enjoy a utility level that is lower than the level of utility he would enjoy if he was not a constituent of the economy. (4) Feasibility : any mechanism should rely exclusively on the resources generated within the economy, i.e. no outside funding should be permitted. It turns out that no mechanism satisfies all of the above requirements. We proceed to examine mechanisms that each satisfy three of the properties above. Figure 2 sketches a plan of the paper. Each triangle corresponds to a section of the paper This project directly embraces two well established strands of the literature and indirectly relates to one more. Holmström [7] shows that while investigating the thin and thick lined triangles we will inevitably be considering Groves mechanisms. The discussion of the dashed lined triangle follows the tradition of axiomatic cost sharing. In its aim, rather than in terms of the actual mechanism proposed, we may associate it with Moulin and Shenker [9] . Aside from the agenda we pursue in this paper, a parallel literature deals with decentralized outcomes that may arise in situations similar to the ones we explore. In their seminal contribution Selten and Pool [10] introduce a general model of language acquisition. They show that an equilibrium of the multi-country multilingual language acquisition model exists. The characterization of an equilibrium is then studied by Church and King [1] . Recently, Ginsburgh et al. [5] and Gabszewicz et al. [4] study qualitative properties of such equilibria in the context of bilingual societies. In our model one may rationalize different Nash Equilibria, exhibiting both one-sided as well as multi-sided learning. However, the efficient outcome does not generically come about as a Nash Equilibrium. 1 The reader may wonder: what of the missing triangle? It is not very fruitful to drop Strategy-Proofness. If we were to do so, we could propose the Equal Split allocation rule. All individuals share the same portion of the Assignment Efficient pie. This rule satisfies a long list of desirable properties alongside the ones we have already proposed. However, by failing only Strategy-Proofness, its practical appeal becomes questionable.
Our proposal involves three mechanisms. Each can be criticized from the point of view of the property it fails. In economies consisting of few individuals the antithesis can be pretty stark. For instance, the least wasteful mechanism within the class of mechanisms satisfying all properties except Feasibility, may generate a deficit larger than the value that the assignment efficient communication structure generates. Conversely, insisting on Feasibility at the expense of Individual Rationality, at some instances, may mean that as many as all the individuals in the economy face a negative utility. These phenomena arise solely in economies comprising few individuals. In those cases the mechanisms that fail Assignment Efficiency seem to have the edge. However, there is a price to pay. Any such mechanism will need to rely on the ability of a Planner to exclude individuals by appropriately selecting the assignment of languages. Under this regime, individuals often will have an incentive to unilaterally deviate and learn more languages than those the allocation prescribes for them. We are all accustomed to institutions that demand of us a certain skill set and that, moreover, control for our mastery over it. However, it is unnatural for an institution to act so as to prevent learning. Any mechanism that violates Assignment Efficiency will need to have this feature. On the positive side we find that all these difficulties vanish in 'large economies'. Largeness is meant in the replication sense. Therefore, a large economy is far from an economy consisting of an infinity of individuals. Indeed, a 'large economy' may not be large at all. Under mild assumptions, we show that any economy replicated a finite number of times yields an environment in which all the mechanisms we propose come close to satisfying the property they miss.
In section 2 we present the model, followed by the introduction of our key axioms in section 3. Sections 4-6 deal respectively with each of the three triangles of Figure 1 . Section 7 concludes. Some computational considerations along with some proofs are presented in the appendices.
The model
The finite set of individuals is denoted N ⊆ N. The finite set of languages is denoted Λ. For each i ∈ N the Λ-dimensional vector l i ∈ {0, 1} Λ is the comprehensive description of that individual's linguistic achievement 2 . For instance, if Λ = λ, µ, ν and for some i ∈ N we have l i = (1, 0, 1) we infer that i speaks languages λ and ν. Initially, each individual speaks one language, his native one. We denote l i ∈ {0, 1} Λ the initial language endowment of each i ∈ N . Thus, in the previous example, if agent i's native language is λ then l i = (1, 0, 0). Let γ : N → Λ, determine agent i's native language. For each i ∈ N , define N γ(i) to be the set of agents whose native language is the same as i. The amount of effort that one needs to exert in order to learn a foreign language depends on his native tongue. The Λ × Λ matrix C with typical element c λµ ∈ R + provides this information. In particular, c λµ is the cost of learning language µ if one's native language is λ. Our only assumptions are that c λµ = 0, whenever λ = µ and c λµ < ∞ for each λ, µ ∈ Λ.
The benefit one derives from learning foreign languages is simply a linear function of the number of individuals one can communicate with as a result of his linguistic achievement. The marginal willingness to communicate is measured, for each individual, by the parameter θ i ∈ R + . Hence, for individual i ∈ N , the expression
specifies his gross benefit from communication. The expression above does not include the benefit one derives from communicating with people with whom he shares the same mother tongue. This value is a constant. Whether the gross benefit accounts for it or not, has no bearing on our results.
For instance, let N = {1, 2, 3}, Λ = {English, F rench, Italian} and suppose that each individual has a different native language. Then, for each i, j ∈ N , l i l j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, that is i and j may have 2 Abusing notation we will denote by N, Λ both the sets and their cardinality. 3 Part of the complexity of the problem proceeds from the min operator. Even if one was to allow l i to take values in an interval, say [0, 1], the maximization problem would still have as many as N points of non-differentiability. Therefore, the discrete nature of the problem would persist.
as many as three languages in common. By contrast, min{1, l i l j } ∈ {0, 1}. Utility is generated by the amount of communication alone. Agents do not care neither with whom they communicate, nor in what language they do so.
On the other hand, the disutility pertaining to action l i , given l i and C, is l i C(l i − l i ). Hence, for each i ∈ N , the net benefit associated with
To simplify things we will write, for each
In order to better understand the model, consider the following example. Again we have three agents with different mother-tongues, say English, French and Italian. The figure below summarizes their marginal utilities, the cost matrix C and the actions taken by the agents and the related network structure. Assume that both the French and the Italian learn English. Therefore, each individual has a language in common with the rest. The net benefit for the Italian is : v(l N , 2) = 2×(# of links)−c IE =2×2−1=3.
Each individual also consumes a transfer t i ∈ R. The final utility of each individual is then
where E is the set of economies complying with our assumptions.
An allocation is a list (l N , t N ) ≡ (l i , t i ) i∈N where l i is a linguistic assignment for individual i and t i is the transfer he receives. Let Z be the set of all allocations. In addition, for each e ∈ E and each l N ∈ {0, 1} Λ×N , let π(l N ; e) = i∈N v i l N ; θ i be the sum of net benefits generated by the allocation. A mechanism is a function ϕ defined over E that associates with each economy an allocation (l N , t N ) ∈ Z.
Axioms
In this section we formally define the four core properties that motivate the discussion. We begin by Assignment Efficiency. For each e ∈ E let
be the set of all the linguistic assignments that maximize the sum of net benefits for a given economy. A mechanism is Assignment Efficient if, for each economy in the admissible domain, it selects an allocation whose linguistic assignment component maximizes the sum of net benefits. Assignment Efficiency differs from Pareto Efficiency in that it does not require transfers to sum up to zero.
The next axiom is motivated by the fact that the social planner does not necessarily know the individuals' willingness to communicate. In fact, some individuals might find it profitable do behave strategically and misreport it. We require that each individual has a weakly dominant strategy to reveal his willingness to communicate truthfully.
Since the domain of preference profiles is convex (and hence smoothly connected) we know from Holmstrom [7] that a mechanism satisfies Assignment Efficiency and Strategy Proofness if and only if it belongs to the family of Groves mechanisms (see Groves [6] ).
Such mechanisms determine a transfer composed of two parts. First, each agent receives the total net benefit obtained by all other agents at the assignment chosen by the mechanism. Second, each agent receives a sum of money that does not depend on his own (announced) willingness to communicate. Let h i be a real-valued function defined on R N −1 + such that for each i ∈ N and θ N ∈ R N + , h i depends at most on θ N \{i} . In other words, the function h i does not depend on individual i's willingness to communicate.
The Groves Mechanism
For each e ∈ E, (l N , t N ) = ϕ g (e) if and only if l N ∈ Σ(e) and, for each
In general, for Groves mechanisms, the sum of the transfers may be either positive or negative. Generically there is a waste. However, there is a particular difficulty pertaining to a deficit. A Planner will need to finance the Groves scheme using resources that are not generated within the economy. Any mechanism, be it Groves or not, by construction, is silent as to where these outside funds may be found. Feasibility requires of mechanisms to be self-sustainable.
Feasibility
For each e ∈ E and each (l N , t N ) ∈ Z such that (l N , t N ) = ϕ(e), i∈N t i ≤ 0.
Finally, as a minimal fairness property, we will require voluntary participation of individuals to the proposed scheme. In other words, we consider as unappealing, from an ethical point of view, mechanisms that have to rely on an authority coercing agents to interact. All individuals must enjoy a positive utility. Aside from the benefit they derive from communicating with their compatriots, a value that does not appear in their utility function as defined, none should suffer by participating in the proposed scheme.
Individual Rationality For each e ∈ E and each i ∈ N , u i (ϕ i (e); θ i ) ≥ 0.
An Individually Rational Groves Mechanism
In this section we will focus on the sub-class of Groves mechanisms that satisfy Assignment-Efficiency, Strategy-Proofness and Individual Rationality. It is well known that in order to obtain individual rationality one has to allow the center to run deficits (Thomson [11] ). Interestingly, in our model the introduction of individual rationality has extreme consequences. We conjecture in fact that, for each allocation mechanism belonging to this subclass and each e ∈ E, there will be a deficit, namely i∈N t i ≥ 0. We show that this is actually the case in some relevant sub-domains. We propose a mechanism that has the property of minimizing such a deficit. For each e ∈ E, i ∈ N let e i denote an economy that is otherwise identical to e, except for the fact that agent i's willingness to communicate has been set equal to zero, that is if e = (θ N , l N , C) then e i = ((0, θ N \{i} ), l N , C). In addition, let l i N ∈ Σ(e i ) denote an efficient linguistic assignment in such an economy.
The Minimal Deficit Mechanism (MDM) For each e ∈ E, (l N , t N ) = ϕ md (e) if and only if l N ∈ Σ(e) and, for each i ∈ N ,
In order to calculate the transfers the Planner assesses the impact of each agent by setting his willingness to communicate equal to zero and then recalculating the optimal amount of communication.
Consider the example depicted in Figure 4 . The top-left side of the figure describes the economy. The numbers in parentheses are a names of individuals.The number beside it represents their marginal willingness to communicate. On the left side we have agents whose mother-tongue is English on the right side agents whose mother-tongue is Italian. The learning costs are respectively c EI = 1.1, c IE = 1.6. At the efficient linguistic assignment both the Italians would be asked to learn English (as depicted by the arrows). Such an outcome would generate a sum of net benefits π = 5, 7. Then we set the willingness to communicate of each agent equal to zero and we compute again the efficient assignment. Interestingly a slight perturbation in the original problem can drastically change the efficient linguistic assignment. For each i ∈ N , π i denotes the sum of net benefits at the optimal assignment when agent i's marginal willingness to communicate is set equal to zero. Once we have performed this exercise we can compute the transfers in the following way:
Agent 1, 2 and 3 are taxed while agent 4 and 5 are subsidized. Such an allocation produces a deficit equal to 0.9. A comparison with the pivotal mechanism (see Clarke [2] ), which in our framework also belongs to the class of mechanisms satisfying Individual Rationality, seems particularly interesting. This mechanism corresponds to the case in which, for
is the efficient linguistic assignment in the counterfactual situation where agent i is removed from the economy. In the canonical public good provision model whether an individual is removed from the economy or his valuation of the project is set to zero, amounts to the same effect. In our framework, an individual is still a potential source of value for the rest even if his willingness to communicate is equal to zero. Therefore, while the two mechanisms would coincide in the public good provision model, it is easy to check that in our model the MDM produces a smaller deficit than the pivotal mechanism.
We claim that the sum of the transfers pertaining to the minimal deficit mechanism is always nonnegative. While we are unable to prove the statement in general, first, simulations suggest that it is true and, second, we provide a proof for the case of large economies. The importance of the statement will become apparent in the proof of Proposition 1.
where l N ∈ Σ(e) and, for each i ∈ N , l i N ∈ Σ(e i ).
Proposition 1. Assume Conjecture 1 holds. Then for each e ∈ E the MDM is the least wasteful among all the mechanisms satisfying Assignment Efficiency, Strategy-Profness and Individual Rationality.
Proof. By Assignment Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness we need to compare our mechanism with other mechanisms belonging to the Groves family of mechanisms. Moreover, by Individual Rationality we need to have, for each e ∈ E and each i ∈ N
where l N ∈ Σ(e). Hence, for any given profile θ N \{i} ∈ R N −1 the component i∈N v i (l N ; θ i ), which is the sum of net benefits at an efficient linguistic assignment, reaches its minimum value when agent i's willingness to communicate is equal to zero. Hence, in order to satisfy Individual Rationality we need to set, for each e ∈ E, i ∈ N ,
where l i N ∈ Σ(e i ). Moreover,
If conjecture 1 holds the right hand side of equation 4.3 is always non-negative and it is the lower bound of i∈N t i . Hence in order to minimize the waste produced by the mechanism we need to set
The main consequence of conjecture 1 is that any individually rational Groves mechanism runs a deficit. We show, in what follows, that the statement of Conjecture 1 holds true in particular environments. A first relevant case is represented by large economies. This seems quite surprising since, as pointed for example by Deb, Razzolini and Seo [3] , some members of the Clarke-Groves family are asymptotically balanced as the number of agents increases in a well-behaved way, for instance by replication. We adopt the replication view of largeness. Letting ρ ∈ N * , where N * ≡ N + \ {0}, we may appeal to the following definition.
Definition 1.
For each e ∈ E, e ρ ∈ E, comprising a set of agents N ρ , is ρ−replica of e if and only if
• the set of languages and the cost matrix is the same in both economies, • there exists a mapping ξ : N ρ → N such that for each i ∈ N, |ξ −1 (i)| = ρ, and
Starting from any economy in the domain there exists a finite number of replications ρ that guarantees that the erratic response to slight perturbations in the economy that Figure 4 depicts, vanishes. Individuals become negligible and, therefore, the optimal linguistic assignment in any large economy e ρ ∈ E will change minimally, if at all, when considering e i ρ ∈ E, for any i ∈ N ρ . The following Proposition builds on this fact. Refer to Appendix 1 for a proof.
Proposition 2.
For each e ∈ E, there exists some finite ρ ∈ N * such that for each ρ ≥ ρ , and each e ρ ∈ E, Conjecture 1 holds.
Proposition 2 shows us that in large economies it is not possible to obtain an assignment-efficient, strategy-proof and individually rational allocation that is feasible. However the result is silent regarding the size of the deficit. This parameter is crucial in assessing the significance of the minimal deficit mechanism. The following result states that the deficit is, for each economy in the domain, less or equal to the total cost associated with an efficient linguistic assignment in that economy.
Proposition 3. For each e ∈ E and each
Proof. The statement derives from the fact that,
where l N ∈ Σ(e) and l 
which constitutes a contradiction, as, by assumption, l i N ∈ Σ(e i ). Summing over i ∈ N we obtain
and a simple algebraic manipulation yields
The following assumption will enable us to make precise statements regarding both the size of the deficit as well as individual transfers in large economies. While it is not the weakest assumption that would serve our purpose, it is the most natural. The complexity we are stirring away from involves situations where an entire language group has zero willingness to communicate. Including such economies enriches the mathematical aspect of the problem without, however, advancing the discussion.
Assumption 1.
For each e ∈ E and each i ∈ N , θ i ∈ (0, θ] for some finite θ ∈ R + .
Consider the three-agent, three-language economy e, depicted on the left side of Figure 5 . Assume that θ E > 0, while θ F = θ I = 0. One can easily find a cost matrix such that the efficient linguistic assignment is as depicted on the left side of Figure 5 . In fact, by appropriately choosing the cost matrix one may face a situation in which this communication pattern persists under replications. On the right side of Figure 5 we depict the 3-replica of the initial economy. Consider an economy e i 3 , for some individual i belonging to the english group. That individual will not learn any language at an efficient linguistic assignment. If he was to do so, he would add only a negative value, his cost, to the sum of net benefits. Therefore, if l N ∈ Σ(e 3 ) and l i N ∈ Σ(e i 3 ), for some individual i belonging to the english group, we conclude that l N = l i N . Under assumption 1, we will be able to show that the efficient linguistic assignment in any large economy e remains unchanged when considering e i , for any i ∈ N . We demonstrate that in three steps. We begin by identifying the first-order conditions associated with problem of determining the set of efficient linguistic assignments. Figure 5 . The role of Assumption 1
Proof.
If l N is optimal for some economy e ∈ E then for each i ∈ N unilaterally reducing the amount of communication (condition 4.4), or unilaterally increasing the amount of communication (condition 4.5) must decrease the sum of utilities.
The fact that each agent has, even if minimal, some interest in communicating with other agents, guarantees first of all that after a certain number of replications the efficient communicative structure will be such that everyone communicates with everyone else. This observation will be key. In order to formally prove it, we will need to introduce a new piece of notation. For each e ∈ E, let
define the set of linguistic assignments that ensure that all individuals have a language in common.
Lemma 2. For each e ∈ E, under assumption 1, there exists ρ ∈ N * such that, for each ρ > ρ, and each
Proof.
Take any e ∈ E that satisfies Assumption 1. Suppose that for each ρ ∈ N * and each e ρ ∈ E,
Λ×Nρ such that
there is always an agent j ∈ N ρ , such that, by learning a new language is able to achieve a sum of gross benefits of at least ρθ j . Morevorer by assumption 1 such a benefit is always stricltly positive. In addition, for someρ ∈ N * , some j ∈ Nρ and some l Nρ ∈ Σ(eρ) such that l Nρ / ∈ L f (eρ), it must hold true thatρ
This implies that also the left-hand side of equation 4.6 is strictly positive, but this, by condition 4.5, contradicts the fact that l Nρ ∈ Σ(eρ).
Lemma 2 proves that after a certain number of replications the efficient assignment will necessarily involves a situation where all agents have at least a language in common. Following the same argument, we can also argue that if ρ ∈ N * is big enough such a communicative structure will persist regardless of small perturbations in the parameters of the problem.
Lemma 3.
For each e ∈ E, under Assumption 1, there exists ρ ∈ N * such that, for each ρ > ρ , each e ρ ∈ E, and each i ∈ N ρ , l Nρ ∈ Σ(e ρ ) if and only if l Nρ ∈ Σ(e i ρ ) Proof.
By lemma 2, there must exist some ρ ∈ N * , such that, not only we have
for each i ∈ N . Namely, after a certain number of replicas, by setting individual i's willingness to communicate equal to zero, for each i ∈ N ρ , the efficient linguistic assignment always achieves full communication. Moreover assume l N ρ ∈ Σ(e ρ ) and for some i
, l N ρ would guarantee, in e ρ , the same gross benefit as l N ρ but at a lower total cost. This yields the desired contradiction. The if part of the statement can be proven using a similar argument.
It finally turns out that, under assumption 1, the transfer associated with the minimal deficit mechanism can be easily computed in large economies. Each individual is payed his own learning cost.
Proposition 4.
For each e ∈ E, under assumption 1, there exists ρ ∈ N * such that, for each ρ > ρ , each e ρ ∈ E, each (l Nρ , t Nρ ) ∈ Z such that (l Nρ , t Nρ ) = ϕ md (e ρ ) and each i ∈ N ρ
where l Nρ ∈ Σ(e ρ ) and l 
Some algebraic manipulation yelds
This means that the, in large economies, the deficit deriving from the implementation of the MDM equals the sum of the learning costs individuals have to face at the optimal assignment. Such a result might seem quite discouraging but in order to have a complete picture we should also consider the value generated in the economy. As in Moulin [8] we take as a measure of the efficiency loss of the mechanism the ratio between the deficit run by the mechanism and the sum of net benefits generated. More formally, for each e ∈ E and each (l N , t N ) ∈ Z such that (l N , t N ) = ϕ md (e), define the ratio of the deficit over the sum of net benefits (4.9)
L(e) = i∈N t i π(l N ; e)
In a large economy by Proposition 2, we have
Some algebraic manipulation yields
Hence as ρ grows larger, L(e) tends to zero. However, it is important to note that in small economies the following paradoxical scenario might arise. Consider an economy comprising three individuals each speaking one of languages α, β, γ: θ i = 1 for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Moreover, c βα = c γα = 2, 9 while the rest of the elements of the cost matrix are equal to 10. It is easy to compute that the ratio L(e) in this economy will be greater than 1, that is the deficit pertaining to our mechanism is greater than the sum of net benefits. Notice, finally, that the definition of a full structure we offer above is silent about the actual structure that prevails at the optimum. Typically, full communication will be achieved by convergence to a common language. This, however, is not the only possibility. The following example demonstrates.
Consider the following three-agent economy: etc. Figure 6 . In 'large economies' convergence to common language is not necessarily the optimal structure.
Refer to Figure 6 . In the original economy it would be optimal for the Italian to learn French, for the English to learn Italian and for the French to learn English. We would thus have a full network but not a convergence toward a common language. Interestingly, by replicating this economy, the optimal structure still follows the same path.
4.1. Largeness in bilingual societies. So far we have based our results in the existence of an economy specific number of replications that ensures that the economy is 'large enough'. By focusing our attention on bilingual economies we are able to determine a threshold for this parameter. Moreover, in Appendix 2, we provide an algorithm that solves the Pareto Efficiency problem for the two language case. The algorithm without per se dealing with the computational difficulties that may arise when the number of languages increases, nonetheless provides some indication that the problem might become eventually unmanageable from the computational point of view.
Consider the following simple two-language economy: (1) There are only 2 languages α and β.
(2) Let c βα be the cost of learning language α given that agent knows language β. Similarly, let c αβ be the cost of learning language β given that agent knows language α. 
The spirit of the statement will be as follows. Fix any arbitrary non-negative real number T . Propositions 5 and 6 determine the number of individuals that need to have a willingness to communicate greater than T for Conjecture 1 to be true. The proofs can be found in Appendix 3. In what follows we assume without loss of generality that c αβ ≤ c βα .
Proposition 5. For each positive real number T , let L(T, e) = {i ∈ N | θ i < T } and ζ(T, e) = |L(T, e)|. The following example explains how to read the previous proposition. Consider a bilingual economy where c αβ = 1, c βα = 2, N α = {1, 2, 3, 4}, N β = {5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11} and θ 1 = 3, θ 2 = 2, θ 3 = 1, θ 4 = 0, θ 5 = 3,θ 6 = 3, θ 7 = 2, θ 8 = 2, θ 9 = 1.5, θ 10 = 1.5, θ 11 = 0.5. The number of agents with θ i less that 1, i.e., L(1, e) is {4, 11}. Now ζ(1, e) + 2 + c αβ +c βα 1 = 7. ThereforeN β ≤ 7. Since |N β | = 7 by Proposition 5 the conjecture holds.
Three comments are in line. First, the domain restrictions 'almost' do not rely on preferences. The only consideration is about individuals that are entirely averse to the possibility of communication. Second, the domain restrictions do not require the economy to be large, unless both costs are enormous. Even in such a case though, one needs only one language group to be adequately large for the result to come through. Finally, the proof gives a rather precise picture of the pattern of language learning that is efficient, namely only one side learns.
A feasible Groves Mechanism.
In this section we drop Individual Rationality. In this section we think of the social planner as an agent who is mandated to eliminate wasteful dissipation of money. He has the power to tax an agent even if he does not attach any value to communication. In the previous sections we have established that the deficit of the MDR in each economy is, in absolute terms, smaller than the total cost pertaining to the efficient linguistic assignment in that economy. Consider for each economy, the set of linguistic assignments that ensure full communication, L f (e). Select within this set the subset of linguistic assignments that are the least costly. That is, for each e ∈ E, let
Notice that in order to compute the value c one need not know the profile of preferences. Moreover, for each economy the total cost pertaining to the efficient linguistic assignment in that economy will be weakly less than the value c for that economy. The mechanism we present below charges all individuals to the sum c N on the top of what they were charged by the MDM.
The Translated Minimal Deficit Mechanism (TMDM) For each e ∈ E, (l N , t N ) = ϕ tmd (e) if and only if l N ∈ Σ(e) and, for each i ∈ N
The following propositions shows that the TMDM is feasible.
Proposition 7.
For each e ∈ E and each (l N , t N ) ∈ Z such that (l N , t N ) = ϕ tmd (5.1)
Proof. From lemma 3 we know that, for each e ∈ E and each (l
Hence, summing over i ∈ N , by definition of the TMDM, follows that for each (l N , t N ) ∈ Z such that (l N , t N ) = ϕ tmd (e)
where l N ∈ L f (e). Moreover, for each e ∈ E, and each (l N , t N ) ∈ Z such that (l N , t N ) = ϕ tmd (e) necessarily we must have
otherwise it would be possible to have a linguistic assignement, l N , that grants an higher gross benefit at a lower cost then l N . This would contradict the fact that l N ∈ Σ(e), hence
The TMDR, under assumption 1, is exactly feasible in large economies. This is a direct consequence of its construction. The amount it charges individuals independently of the profile of preferences equals the deficit of the MDR in large economies.
Proposition 8.
For each e ∈ E, under assumption 1, there exists ρ ∈ N * such that, for each ρ > ρ ,
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Proposition 4.
Any mechanism in the class of feasible Groves mechanisms will have a component that charges individuals in a way that must not depend on the linguistic assignment it prescribes. In light of this fact, it is meaningful to require some symmetry in the way individuals are treated in an effort to ensure feasibility. We require of mechanisms to assign the same transfers to each individual in any economy where the efficient linguistic assignment requires no individual to learn any language.
Minimal Symmetry. For each e ∈ E, if, for each l N ∈ Σ(e), l N = l N then t i = t j for each i, j ∈ N .
The following proposition shows that there is no other feasible Groves mechanism that satisfies symmetry and perform strictly better than the TMDM. We prove this by showing that in a two-agent economy it is actually not possible to find an alternative mechanism that welfare dominates the TMDM 
Indeed there might be a mechanism that that is welfare equivalent for a two-agent economy but performs better than ours in all other economies. Our intuition is that this is not possible but we have not been able to prove yet a more general statement.
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality that Λ = {α, β}, l 1 = (1, 0), l 2 = (0, 1) and c = c αβ < c βα . By Assignment Efficiency and Strategy Proofness ϕ belongs to the family of Groves-Clarke mechanisms.
If both θ 1 < c and θ 2 < c then, as can be easily checked, t 1 + t 2 = 0. Hence we need to impose
From this follows that
with k 1 and k 2 ∈ R and k 1 + k 2 = −c. If both θ 1 < c and θ 2 < c then the two agents are not asked to communicate and t 1 + t 2 = −c. Assume then 0 ≥ t 1 + t 2 ≥ −c f or all θ 1 < c and θ 2 < c.
Moreover, by symmetry t 1 = t 2 for all θ 1 < c and θ 2 < c which implies
with ∈ R + . Finally, if θ 1 ≥ c and θ 2 < c (the same argument can be symmetrically applied if θ 2 > c and θ 1 ≤ c) the surplus generated by the TMDM is t 1 + t 2 = θ 2 − c as can be easily verified. On the other hand
If we assume without loss of generality that k 2 < − c 2 we obtain t 1 + t 2 > θ 2 − c + 2 For values of θ 2 close enough to c the sum of the transfers would then be strictly positive contradicting Feasibility.
Two points should be made. First, insisting on Feasibility might have very severe consequences on Individual Rationality. Consider an economy comprising three individuals each speaking one of languages α, β, γ: θ i = 1 for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, while all the elements of the cost matrix are equal to 10. It is easy to verify that by Assignment Efficiency none of the individuals would be asked to learn any language by the TMDR. Nonetheless, each of them would be asked to pay a transfer t i = 10 3 . As a consequence all the agents in the economy would suffer by participating in the proposed scheme. Second, the Pivotal mechanism translated by an amount c is in deficit in large economies under assumption 1. This is interesting because as the economy grows larger such a mechanism can be thought of an approximation of the Translated Minimal Deficit Rule. This latter fact makes us believe that proposition 9 can be generalized to a wider class of economies.
Beyond Groves's Mechanism.
We will need to introduce some new pieces of notation. First, let us define for each e ∈ E and for each X ⊆ N ∪ {∅} the set of linguistic assignments that ensure that all individuals except those in X have a language in common, namely
Within this set we would like to identify the least costly linguistic assignments. Therefore, define for each e ∈ E, for each X ⊆ N ∪ {∅} the set
Obviously, for each e ∈ E and for each
Broadly speaking, the mechanism we introduce below selects the linguistic assignment that minimizes X subject to all individuals obtaining a utility greater than zero. It is more instructive to define the mechanism in terms of the algorithm that underlies it. Note that it relies on the ability of the game designer to enforce punishments, employing, however, means that are not arbitrary, but, rather, embedded in the mechanics of the model. We will come back to this point shortly.
The Maximal Individually Rational Assignment Mechanism (MIRAM) (ϕ mir ) selects for each e ∈ E, an allocation by applying the following algorithm. Let individuals announce a profile of preferences
and check whether the allocation l 1 N with associated transfer
If the answer is yes, stop and select allocation (l
. If the answer is no, define the set X 2 to be such that for each i ∈ X
) and associated transfer
and check whether
If the answer is yes stop and select allocation (l 2 N , t 2 N ), otherwise proceed as above to define X 3 and so on and so forth. The algorithm terminates at most at some stage r for which X 1 ∪ · · · ∪ X r = N . At that stage r, the selected allocation is l N with associated transfer t i = 0, for each i ∈ N .
First we prove that this procedure identifies a Strategy-Proof mechanism, if an individual mis-reports his true preferences he guarantees himself weakly less utility that he would otherwise enjoy.
Proposition 10. For each e ∈ E, the MIRAM satisfies Strategy-Proofness Proof.
Consider e ∈ E. Take any agent i ∈ N whose real willingness to communicate is θ i ∈ R + . By announcing a willingness to communicate θ i ∈ R + such that θ i > θ i , agent i would not change, at each step r, the decision taken by the algorithm if already
. If on the contrary, for some r, inequality 6.3 holds in the opposite direction, by announcing a higher willingness to communicate he might be assigned an allocation that gives him a negative utility. The argument work similarly if θ i < θ i .
In addition, by construction the MIRAM is Feasible and Individually Rational. Finally, under Assumption 1, it has the property of being assignment efficient if the economy is replicated a sufficient amount of times.
Proposition 11. For each e ∈ E, under assumption 1, there exists ρ ∈ N * such that, for each ρ > ρ , each e ρ ∈ E and each (l Nρ , t Nρ ) ∈ Z such that (l Nρ , t Nρ ) = ϕ mir (e ρ ), l(l Nρ , t Nρ ) ∈ Σ(e ρ ).
Proof.
By lemma 2 we know that for each e ∈ E, for some ρ ∈ N * and for each ρ ≥ ρ , l N ∈ Σ(e ρ ) is equivalent to l N ∈ L f (e ρ ). Moreover, by definition, for each e ∈ E, L f (e) = L f * (e|∅). Finally, for ρ big enough the maximal individually rational assignment mechanism terminates after one round, i.e. when X 1 = ∅ Let us stress that the result above is independent of the way the cost is shared among conceding individuals at each stage r. In fact, any arbitrary way to share the cost would be in line with Proposition 11. This relies on the fact that the algorithm terminates at any stage only if all participants enjoy a positive level of utility and, after a certain number of replicas this is what we expect to happen. However, by charging all conceding individuals at each stage unequally, we might need a bigger number of replicas to guarantee a positive utility to the agents who are charged a higher share of the cost. On the contrary, by charging all conceding individuals at each stage equally we make sure that our mechanism will select an assignment efficient allocation after the minimum amount of replications. As encouraging as these observations may be, the mechanism can be criticized on certain grounds.
One may associate with each mechanism the cost of the institution that underlies it. Suppose that Bob is asked to learn spanish on top of his mother tongue. If he fails to do so it is easy to expose him; one needs only to present him with an exam. However, Bob finds it profitable to learn french as well as spanish. Any institution (and it would take a rather authoritarian one) would find it difficult to prevent him. Even if conceivably Bob could be banned from language schools teaching french, it would be hard, indeed costly, to monitor his every step, in order to make sure that his mother, who happens to speak the language, will not home-school him. The following property requires of mechanism to be immune to such individual deviations. No individual should find it profitable to learn more languages than is required of him.
Home-Schooling Proofness: For each e ∈ E, each (l N , t N ) ∈ ϕ(e), each i ∈ N and each l i ∈ {0, 1}
Unfortunately, the mechanism we propose fails this axiom. We can demonstrate that by means of an example. Refer to Figure 6 . The economy comprises of two languages groups N α , N β . When setting X 1 = ∅ the planner finds that some individual j ∈ N β objects. Considering X 2 = N \ {j} he finds that some individual k ∈ N α , also objects. This leaves the Planner with the option of setting X 3 = N . In such a situation any individual with a sufficiently high willingness to communicate, say agent q ∈ N β , may find it profitable to "home-school" himself, in spite of what dictated by the mechanism. Proposition 12. There exists no mechanism ϕ that satisfies Strategy Proofness, Individual Rationality, Feasibility and Home Schooling Proofness.
We construct a counter-example. Suppose that some mechanism ϕ satisfies the axioms. Consider an economy e consisting of two individuals, N = {1, 2}, speaking distinct languages. Let Λ = {α, β}, l 1 = (1, 0) and l 2 = (0, 1). We have θ 1 = θ 2 > c αβ = c βα > 0 and c αβ + c βα > θ 1 , θ 2 . By Home Schooling Proofness, for each (l N , t N ) ∈ ϕ(e) either one of the following must be true:
(1) l 1 − l 1 = (0, 1) and l 2 − l 2 = (0, 0), or (2) l 1 − l 1 = (0, 0) and l 2 − l 2 = (1, 0), or (3) l 1 − l 1 = (0, 1) and l 2 − l 2 = (1, 0).
Consider case (1), i.e. let there exist (l N , t N ) ∈ ϕ(e) such that l 1 − l 1 = (0, 1) and l 2 − l 2 = (0, 0). Suppose that u 1 (l N , t 1 ; θ 1 ) ≥ θ 1 and u 2 (l N , t 2 ; θ 2 ) ≥ θ 2 . Therefore,
By Feasibility, t 1 + t 2 ≤ 0 and hence inequality (6.4) constitutes a contradiction, as by assumption c αβ > 0. The same reasoning applies for cases (2), (3). In conclusion, for each (l N , t N ) ∈ ϕ(e), either u 1 (l N , t 1 ; θ 1 ) < θ 1 or u 2 (l N , t 2 ; θ 2 ) < θ 2 . Without loss of generality, suppose that for each (l N , t N ) ∈ ϕ(e), u 1 (l N , t 1 ; θ 1 ) < θ 1 .
Consider economy e , to be one that is identical to economy e, except for the fact that θ 1 = 0. By Individual Rationality and Feasibility, since c αβ + c βα > θ 2 , there cannot exist (l N , t N ) such that l 1 = (1, 1) and l 2 = (1, 1) . Therefore, by Home Schooling Proofness, for each (l N , t N ) ∈ ϕ(e ), either l 1 = (0, 1) and l 2 = (0, 0), or l 1 = (0, 0) and l 2 = (1, 0). By Individual Rationality, in the former case t 1 ≥ c αβ and in the latter t 1 ≥ 0. This implies that from a profile of announcements (θ 1 , θ 2 ) individual 1 can profitably deviate to the profile (0, θ 2 ) and obtain a utility level equal to θ 1 . Thus, the mechanism ϕ violates Strategy-Proofness, a contradiction.
Assigment Efficiency implies Home Schooling Proofness. In fact, in lemma 1 we show that Home Schooling Proofness is one of the necessary conditions for a linguistic assignment to be assignment efficient. In light of this observation, the proposition above constitutes a formal proof of the fact that no mechanism satisfies the four core properties we put forward.
Discussion
As a final note we raise the following issues.
(1) The model we propose bears an alternative interpretation. The paradigm extends, beyond individuals that derive benefit from communication, to a wider class of entities. Examples are abundant. Historically in the Iberian Peninsula trains are running on tracks of a narrow gauge.
Travelers from France to Spain (and vice versa) had to switch trains. Up until quite recently (and to a lesser extent still), academics would publish the output of their research in the native language of the institute they were affiliated with. In the entertainment industry, content is distributed through platforms that are often incompatible with each other. An HD-DVD player will not play Blu-Ray discs. A track bought on iTunes will not play on Windows Media Player. A Sony Playstation game will not run on Microsoft's Xbox. Therefore, one can speak more generally of platforms rather than languages. (2) One possible interpretation of our results is that they paint a very adverse picture. One may recognize that there is a range of situations where Assignment Efficiency comes either at too high a cost or is not a concern altogether. In the real world there many cases where sub-optimal levels communication prevail. Our results expose some the underlying reasons. MIRAM also satisfies Assignment Efficiency; (b) MDM still does not satisfy feasibility but the ratio between the deficit and the sum of net benefit generated by the allocation tends to zero; (c) the TDM is balanced.
(3) The importance of assumption 1 should not be overstated. In fact we could use a much weaker, although less intuitive assumption, to obtain the same result. It would require that for each economy there exist no language group, all the members of which have a zero willingness to communicate. (4) Similarly, the assumption that each individual speaks only one language natively has no real bearing on the discussion. Apart from complicating notation, dropping it would have no effect on the results.
Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 2.
We arrive at the proof by appealing to some intermediate lemmata.
For each e ∈ E, let L + (e) denote the set of linguistic assignments for which the gross benefit is maximal, i.e.
Lemma 4. For each e ∈ E there exists some ρ ∈ N * such that for each ρ ≥ ρ and each e ρ ∈ E, l Nρ ∈ Σ(e ρ ) only if l Nρ ∈ L + (e ρ ).
Proof.
Consider any e ∈ E and suppose that for each ρ ∈ N * there exists l Nρ ∈ Σ(e ρ ) such that l Nρ / ∈ L(e ρ ). Hence for each ρ ∈ N * and for each e ρ ∈ E there exists some individual i ∈ N ρ , for whom θ i > 0, and some λ ∈ Λ such that individual i does not have a language in common with at least one j ∈ N λ . Therefore, for each ρ ∈ N * there exists some
By assumption costs are finite. Thus, for some finite ρ ∈ N * and for each ρ ≥ ρ we obtain
By lemma 1 this contradicts the fact that l Nρ is optimal.
Lemma 5. For each e ∈ E there exists some ρ ∈ N * such that for each
The proof of lemma 5 is essentially the same as that of lemma 4 and, thus, ommited. It should be noted however that ρ and ρ are two economy specific thresholds which will be typically different. However, it is easy to demonstrate that ρ ≥ ρ for each economy in the admissible domain. Henceforth, we will call some economy e ∈ E large if and only if it proceeds from some other economy e ∈ E through a number of replications that is adequate for both lemmata 4 and 5 to hold. Lemma 6. For each large economy e ∈ E, for each l * N ∈ Σ(e), for each λ ∈ Λ, if there exists i, j ∈ N λ for whom θ i > 0 and θ j > 0, then l * i = l * j .
Consider some large economy e ∈ E, some l * N ∈ Σ(e), some λ ∈ Λ and some i, j ∈ N λ for whom θ i > 0 and θ j > 0. Suppose l * i = l * j and without loss of generality let
+ (e). Therefore, by 8.1, the sum of net benefits at l N is strictly greater that in l * N ; a contradiction. The following lemma states that in a large economy some individual learns two languages or more at an optimum linguistic assignment only if through these languages he communicates with language groups that involve exclusively individuals that have no willingness to communicate whatsoever.
Lemma 7.
For each large economy e ∈ E, with |Λ| ≥ 3, if for some l * N ∈ L + (e), which in addition satisfies conditions 4.4 and 4.5, there exists some i ∈ N , with θ i > 0, who learns a set of languages Λ * i ⊆ Λ at l * N , where |Λ * i | ≥ 2, then either for each λ ∈ Λ * i and each j ∈ N λ , θ j = 0, or for each j ∈ N , for whom θ j > 0, l * i = l * j .
Proof.
Suppose that for some large economy e ∈ E there exists some l * N ∈ Σ(e) and some individual i ∈ N , for whom θ i > 0, such that Λ * i ⊇ {λ, µ}, for some λ, µ ∈ Λ. Moreover, let there exist some j ∈ N µ for whom θ j > 0. By lemma 4, individual j must have a language in common with each k ∈ N \ N µ and individual i must have a language in common with each k ∈ N \ N γ(i) . By assumption, l * N ∈ L + (e) and conditions 4.4 and 4.5 hold. This implies that for each ν ∈ Λ * i ∪ {γ(i)} there exists some k ∈ N that only speaks language ν. Therefore, if ν ∈ Λ * i ∪ {γ(i)} then ν must also be spoken by individual j. The argument can be applied conversely. Hence, l * i = l * j . Finally, by lemma 6 we obtain the desired result.
Lemma 8. For each large economy e ∈ E there exists some l * N ∈ Σ(e) such that for each i ∈ N and for some l
Let l * N ∈ Σ(e). Therefore, by lemma 4,
Consider some l 
In a large economy for eachl N as defined above, for each k = i and for each l k as defined above, in economy e
. By definition, in anyl N individual i learns one or more languages. In the first case, trivially, l N = (l N \{i} , l i ). In the second case, by lemma 7, if l N ∈ Σ(e 1 ) then also
Finally, of all the vectors (l N \{i} , l i ) the one that minimizes the associated cost is (l * N \{i} , l i ). Thus, l N = (l * N \{i} , l i ).
9. Appendix 2. An Algorithm for the Two Languages Case.
In this section we provide an algorithm meant to solve the problem
in the two languages case (i.e., |Λ| = 2). Each agent has at most 2 alternatives (he either learns the other language or not). There are n agents. Therefore, there are most 2 n candidate solutions. From this it follows immediately that Lemma 9. The problem (9.1) achieves an optimal solution. (1) Both agents i 1 and i 2 do not learn the language β, (2) If agent i 2 learns β then agent i 1 must learn β.
Assume by contradiction that there exists, an optimal solution lΣe in which agent i 2 learns β but i 1 does not learn β. (that implies l i1 = (1, 0) and l i2 = (1, 1) )
To obtain a contradiction, we show that it is always possible to find a solutionl N which is a better solution than l N . Setl Therefore, inl we have now taught i 1 the language β and i 2 does not learn β.
Also note that the difference between the communication network of l N andl N is that in l, i 2 is connected to all the members of N β and inl N , i 1 is connected to all the members of N β . Moreover, if i 2 is connected to some agent of N β inl N ( because those agents from N β learnt l 1 ), the same links are there between i 1 and agents of N β in l N . Let S ⊆ N β , such that S and i 2 are not connected inl N . Thus, π(l N ; e) -π(l N ; e) = (θ i1 − θ i2 )|S| ≥ 0. Lemma 11. Let θ i * ≥ θ i for each i ∈ N α . Suppose that agent i * does not learn the language β in the optimal solution. The the optimal solution is 
Implication (9.3) follows from lemma 10. Implication (9.4) follows from the fact that since no agent in N α learns a new language, every time an agent from N β learns α, the new links introduced are unique. Therefore, to create the optimal solution, we only check if the marginal return is positive.
The algorithm is given in Table 9 in based on lemmata 10 and 11 and gives the optimal solution to the two language case.
It can be verified that the algorithm will approximately do |N α ||N β | arithmetic operations (like addition). This implies that at most With (I, J) we denote a structure where a set of I individuals learn language β, and a set of J individuals learn language α. With z(I, J) we denote the value of such a structure. Similarly, define (I i , J i ) and z i (I i , J i ) where the superscript signifies the fact that θ i has been set to zero. Let ζ(e) ∈ N + be the number of individuals in economy e ∈ E for whom θ i = 0.
The following lemmata and Theorem 13 are needed for the proofs of propositions 5 and 6. Then the conjecture holds.
Proof. By Proposition 13,
